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INTRODUCTION
The 2017 term of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
included fourteen precedential appeals from the Court of
International Trade (CIT). Many of these cases turned on the same
issues analyzed in Federal Circuit cases in prior years, such as when a
company can escape the presumption that if it operates in China it
must be part of a non-market economy (NME), or how to properly
determine the value of goods in order to assess a dumping margin. A
few standout cases this term include the Mid Continent Nail Corp. v.
United States1 case, which addressed the extent to which a foreign
exporter must be provided notice of a rule change that might affect it;
the Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States2 case, which examined
whether the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) is
permitted to depart from the statutory “expected method” for valuing
goods; and The Container Store v. United States3 case, which provided
clarity on the definition of unit furniture for classification purposes.4
Part I outlines the cases addressing the classification of goods, which
includes much narrower, case-specific findings. Part II summarizes
dumping-related matters and administrative reviews of antidumping
orders, which were addressed in the vast majority of cases this year.
I.

CLASSIFICATION

All goods imported into the United States must be identified so that
the proper duties, if any, may be applied.5 This process is known as
classification and is conducted by the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), a subsection of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.6 CBP relies on the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule
(HTSUS), a schedule identifying nearly every possible type of
imported product, to conduct its classifications.7 An importer typically
provides CBP with its own classification; however, if CBP disagrees,
then CBP will reclassify the good and charge the importer the

1. 846 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
2. 848 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
3. 864 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
4. The Container Store, 864 F.3d at 1333; Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co., 848 F.3d at
1013; Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1372–73.
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (2012).
6. § 1516.
7. § 3004(c)(1).
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appropriate duties.8 If CBP disagrees, it will reclassify the good and
charge the importer the appropriate duty rate.9 The importer is
permitted to protest those reclassifications.10
A. Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States
In Schlumberger Technology Corp.,11 the Federal Circuit addressed an
appeal from the CIT regarding the classification of imports from
China. In its opinion, the CIT rejected Commerce’s classification of
Schlumberger Technology’s imported bauxite proppants as other
“ceramic wares.”12 The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision in
favor of the importer, Schlumberger.13
The subject goods are used in oil-well servicing and are used to
“prevent[] fractures in rock formations from closing.”14 CBP classified
the bauxite proppants under HTSUS subheading 6909.19.50, “Ceramic
wares for laboratory, chemical, or other technical uses; ceramic troughs,
tubs and similar receptacles of a kind used in agriculture; ceramic pots,
jars and similar articles of a kind used for the conveyance or packing of
goods: Other: Other.”15 This classification resulted in a tariff of four
percent on the imported goods.16
Schlumberger contested the classification and argued that the bauxite
should be classified under HTSUS subheading 2606.00.0060,
“Aluminum ores and concentrates: Bauxite, calcined: Other,” which
allows the materials to enter the United States duty free.17 CBP denied
the protest to reclassify the bauxite, and consequently, Schlumberger
petitioned the CIT for redress.18 The CIT found no reason for CBP to
classify the bauxite as anything other than bauxite as defined in HTSUS
subheading 2606 and granted Schlumberger summary judgment.19
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviews summary judgment decisions
by the CIT de novo.20 To classify merchandise, the Federal Circuit
8. §§ 1484(a)(1)(B), 1500(b).
9. § 1514(a).
10. § 1514.
11. 845 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
12. Id. at 1161, 1162; Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 3d
1304, 1324 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015), aff’d, 845 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
13. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 845 F.3d at 1168.
14. Id. at 1161.
15. Id. at 1161–62.
16. Id. at 1161.
17. Id. at 1162.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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applies a two-part test, considering first what the relevant term within
the classification provision means and second assesses whether the
good falls within that classification.21
The HTSUS governs the classification of all imported goods, and,
within the HTSUS, there are a number of General Rules of Interpretation
(“GRI”) that provide guidance on the classification process.22 GRI-1
provides that the HTSUS headings and chapter or section notes are
controlling in determining “whether the product at issue is classifiable
under the heading.”23 In addition, “[a]bsent contrary legislative intent,
HTSUS terms are to be construed according to their common and
commercial meanings, which are presumed to be the same.”24
In this case, the Government argued that the bauxite fell within the
definition of ceramics because, in the creation of the bauxite
proppants, the proppants go through a granulation and shaping
process much like ceramics do when being fired in a kiln.25 However,
the Federal Circuit concluded that the common definition of
“shaping” does not include the sieving process through which the
proppants go.26 Additionally, the examples in the notes section to the
ceramics heading include flower pots, fittings for doors and windows,
and other items that seem distinct from the bauxite proppants.27 On
the contrary, the Federal Circuit found that the proppants fit neatly
into the heading proposed by Schlumberger.28
B. The Container Store v. United States
In The Container Store, the Federal Circuit addressed the proper
description of elfa® top tracks and hanging standards, imported by The
Container Store.29 The imported goods were classified by CBP under
HTSUS heading 8302.41.60 as base metal mountings and fittings
suitable for buildings.30 The Container Store filed a protest and argued
that the goods should be classified instead under HTSUS heading

21. Id. (citing Sigma-Tau HealthScience, Inc. v. United States, 838 F.3d 1272, 1276
(Fed. Cir. 2016)).
22. Id. at 1163.
23. Id.
24. Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted).
25. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 845 F.3d at 1161, 1164–65.
26. Id. at 1165.
27. Id. at 1166.
28. Id. at 1166–67.
29. The Container Store v. United States, 864 F.3d 1326, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
30. Id. at 1328.
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9403.90.80 as parts of furniture.31 CBP denied the protests, The
Container Store appealed, and the CIT upheld CBP’s classification.32
The HTSUS includes general categories of merchandise, as well as
particularized subcategories of merchandise in its headings and
subheadings.33 The GRI for the HTSUS say that CBP is to apply the
categories in “numerical order, and if a particular rule resolves the
classification issue, there is no need to examine subsequent rules.”34
This case addressed the question of whether the top tracks and
hanging standards, which form the base components for the
expandable elfa® system, constituted “mountings and fittings suitable
for furniture” under subheading 8302.42.30, or other “parts of
furniture” under subheading 9403.90.80.35 The latter includes unit
furniture, which consists of different elements that fit together to form
a larger system.36 The Container Store contended that the components
of the elfa® system are unit furniture and should be classified under
subheading 9403.90.80.37
The Federal Circuit agreed with The Container Store and found that
the top tracks and hanging standards were not furniture in and of
themselves, but rather the “indispensable structural framework for the
elfa® modular storage unit.”38 These component parts were not
covered by heading 8203 and did not fit into the description of goods
listed in that subheading’s explanatory note.39 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit found that the goods were improperly classified and
thus reversed and remanded the case to the CIT.40

31. Id.
32. Id. at 1328–29; see The Container Store v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 3d 1331,
1348 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016), rev’d, 864 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
33. The Container Store, 864 F.3d at 1329 (citing Wilton Indus., Inc. v. United States,
741 F.3d 1263, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
34. Id. at 1329 (citing CamelBak Prods., LLC v. United States, 649 F.3d 1361, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
35. Id. at 1330.
36. Id. at 1330 (citing StoreWALL, LLC v. United States, 644 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)) (classifying a similar organizing and storage system as “unit furniture”
under heading 9403).
37. Id. at 1330.
38. Id. at 1330–31.
39. Id. at 1332 (“Explanatory Note 83.02 does not exclude from heading 8302 any
mounting or fitting ‘essential’ to an article, but instead excludes only those mountings
and fittings that ‘form[ ] an essential part of the structure of the article.’”).
40. Id. at 1333.
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C. Chemtall, Inc. v. United States
In Chemtall, Inc. v. United States,41 the Federal Circuit addressed the proper
classification of imported acrylamide tertiary butyl sulfonic acid (ATBS).42
The importer challenged the CBP’s classification of the imported good,
claiming ATBS was an amide or a derivative or salt of an amide.43 The
Federal Circuit focused its analysis on the chemical make-up of ATBS and
concluded that ATBS is not an amide. Therefore, it is subject to a 6.5%
duty rate rather than the 3.7% rate applied to Acrylamide.44
The central element of dispute in Chemtall turns on the meaning of the
term “derivative” under HTSUS 2924, which applies to both acyclic
amides and their derivatives.45 While the Government argued that the
term should refer to compounds that are related in structure, Chemtall
argued that it should refer to compounds that are chemically derived
from another compound.46 The CIT found that the common meaning
of the word “derivative” aligned with the Government’s narrower
definition.47 Chemtall cited to two organic chemistry textbooks to
support its interpretation, but the CIT concluded that Chemtall had
mischaracterized the explanations found in those textbooks.48
Additionally, both parties relied upon the inconsistent explanatory notes
to subheading 2924.19.80.00 of the HTSUS, and the CIT did not find the
explanatory notes helpful in this instance.49 Ultimately, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision and similarly found that the evidence
supported the Government’s positon that ATBS should be classified as an
amide and should be subject to the higher duty category.50

41. 878 F.3d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
42. Id. at 1015.
43. Id. An amide is a nitrogen atom that is limited to having only hydrogen, alkyl,
or aryl groups bonded to it. Id. at 1016. Because ATBS contains sulfonic acid—a
compound that does not fit within the aforementioned atoms or compounds—the
issue was whether ATBS could be classified as an amide, or whether it was a derivative
of such. Id. at 1022.
44. Id. at 1017.
45. Id. at 1019. The Federal Circuit spent considerable time addressing the
chemical components that make up ATBS. Id. at 1015–17.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1020–21 (finding that the textbooks cited do not support Chemtall’s
positions because they “suggest that amides have only hydrogen or hydrocarbyls . . .
bonded to the nitrogen of the amide functional group”).
49. Id. at 1022, 1024–25.
50. Id. at 1026–27.
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ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES

Dumping occurs when a foreign exporter purposefully sell goods in the
United States at a lower price than the domestic market such that the
importer gains a market share and domestic sellers are harmed.51
Domestic firms injured as a result of dumping may petition Commerce to
investigate and levy antidumping duties on the foreign exporters.52 These
duties are calculated by comparing the normal price for the goods sold
on the foreign home market and the export price for those same goods.53
If the margin between those prices is more than de minimis, Commerce
will use that difference as the dumping margin.54 Targeted dumping is a
pattern of export prices for comparable merchandise that differ
significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time.55
To determine whether an exporter is in fact dumping in the United
States, Commerce must first establish whether the goods are being sold
in the United States at less than fair value. To do so, Commerce must
determine which prices to use for comparison by applying one of three
methodologies:
(1) Average-to-transaction (“A-T”), in which Commerce compares
the weighted average of the normal values to the export (or
constructed export prices) of individual transactions. (2) Averageto-average (“A-A”), in which Commerce compares the weighted
average of the normal values to the weighted average of the export
prices (or constructed export prices).
(3) Transaction-totransaction (“T-T”), in which Commerce compares the normal value
of an individual transaction to the export price (or constructed
export price) of an individual transaction.56

In general, Commerce will apply the average-to-average methodology
unless a particular case requires an exception.57 One such exception to
this general rule is a case in which “there is a pattern of export prices
(or constructed export prices) for comparable merchandise that differ
significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time” and
Commerce explains why these differences cannot be taken into account

51. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2012); see also Kevin J. Fandl, 2016 International Trade Law
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1381, 1382–84 (2018).
52. § 1673a.
53. Union Steel v. United States, 713 F.3d 1101, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
54. Id. at 1103, 1108.
55. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B)(i); see also Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United
States, 846 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining targeted dumping).
56. Apex Frozen Foods, 862 F.3d at 1340–41 (citing Union Steel v. United States, 713
F.3d 1101, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2013)); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
57. 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(c)(1) (2012).
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using the average-to-average methodology.58 This exception is meant to
address concerns over “targeted dumping.”59
The third methodology is specifically used for cases of alleged targeted
dumping.60 However, to use that methodology, Commerce must first find
a pattern indicative of targeted dumping, and then justify its decision not
to apply one of the first two methods.61 The use of the third method,
often in combination with a controversial practice called “zeroing,”62 was
limited by a regulation called the Limiting Regulation. The Limiting
Regulation stated that when it applies the third methodology, Commerce
can only include sales considered to be targeted dumping.63
In 2008, Commerce eliminated the Limiting Regulation, which had been
a part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.64 This regulatory withdrawal
was conducted without following the required notice-and-comment
process because Commerce asserted an exception for “good cause.”65
The International Trade Administration (ITA) conducts a second
investigation to determine whether the domestic industry in the
United States is materially threatened by the import of the subject
goods into the United States.66 If the ITA concludes that U.S. industry
is materially threatened and Commerce identifies a difference in home
and export market prices, Commerce issues a final determination
establishing the applicable dumping margins.67 These determinations
can be challenged by affected parties.68
A. Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States
In Mid Continent Nail Corp., the Federal Circuit considered Mid
Continent Nail’s challenge to the alleged targeted dumping of another
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B) (2012).
59. Apex Frozen Foods, 862 F.3d at 1341; see also Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United
States, 846 F.3d 1364, 1376, 1376 n.8 (2017).
60. See § 1677f-1(d)(B)(i); Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1369.
61. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1369.
62. Id. at 1369–70 (quoting Union Steel v. United States, 713 F.3d 1101, 1104 (Fed.
Cir. 2013)). Zeroing refers to the practice in which “negative dumping margins (i.e.,
margins of sales of merchandise sold at nondumped prices) are given a value of zero
and only positive dumping margins (i.e., margins for sales of merchandise sold at
dumped prices) are aggregated.” Id.
63. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1370 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(f)(2) (2008)).
64. Id. at 1370 (citing Withdrawal of the Regulatory Provisions Governing
Targeted Dumping in Antidumping Duty Investigations, Interim Final Rule, 73 Fed.
Reg. 74,930, 74,931 (Dec. 10, 2008)).
65. Id.
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2)(A)–(B).
67. Id.
68. Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1103.
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nail importer, Precision Fasteners, in light of Commerce’s
noncompliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).69 In 2011,
Commerce applied its third methodology to evaluate potentially
dumping70 by Precision Fasteners, a defendant in Mid Continent Nail Corp.,
which imports of steel nails from the United Arab Emirates (UAE);
Commerce ultimately found a dumping margin of 2.51%.71
The CIT assessed the alleged dumping by reviewing all sales—not
only targeted dumping sales.72 Precision argued to the CIT that
Commerce violated the APA by failing to follow the notice-andcomment procedures when rescinding the Limiting Regulation.73 It
further contended that, had Commerce applied the Limiting
Regulation and only considered the sales by Precision that would qualify
as targeted dumping, Commerce still could not justify the use of the
average-to-transaction methodology because Commerce had previously
determined that less than one percent of Precision’s imports constituted
dumping.74 The CIT agreed that Commerce violated its duties under
the APA and remanded the decision back to Commerce to reassess
Precision’s dumping margin utilizing the Limiting Regulation.75
After correctly applying the Limiting Regulation, Commerce found
Precision’s dumping to be de minimis and applied a duty rate of zero
percent.76 Mid Continent Nail again challenged Commerce’s finding,
arguing that Commerce misapplied the Limiting Regulation.77 The CIT
affirmed the decision by Commerce on remand.78 Mid Continent Nail

69. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1368–70.
70. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
71. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1368–71. In 2011, Mid Continent Nail
filed a petition with Commerce alleging that certain steel nail imports from the UAE
resulted in targeted dumping. Id. at 1368. When Commerce opened an investigation
into the matter, it determined that Precision was a “mandatory respondent[], i.e., an
importer whose dumping rate would be individually determined in the course of the
investigation.” Id. at 1368–69. Mid Continent Nail argued that the Limiting
Regulation was properly withdrawn, resulting in a dumping margin that meant that
Precision engaged in targeted dumping, while Precision contended that Commerce
was required to apply the Limiting Regulation because its 2008 withdrawal notice was
ineffective. Id. at 1369–71.
72. Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1318–19 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2014), aff’d, 864 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
73. Id. at 1319–20.
74. Id. at 1320.
75. Id. at 1321, 1330.
76. Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1324 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
77. Id. at 1326.
78. Id. at 1327.
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appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the decision of the CIT.79
In the appeal, Mid Continent argued that Commerce’s Request for
Comment and Proposed Methodology on the Limiting Regulation
satisfied the notice-and-comment requirement.80 The Request for
Comment and the Request for Proposed Methodology were issued in
The Request for Comment was
2007 and 2008, respectively.81
Commerce’s attempt to solicit feedback on the best method to determine
the existence of targeted dumping, admitting that it had little experience
with this process.82 That request was not published as a notice of proposed
rulemaking.83 In the Request for Proposed Methodology, Commerce
acknowledged the responses received, proposed a methodology, and
sought additional comments.84 The Federal Circuit acknowledged
both of these notices as merely requests for comments on which
methodology to choose, not notices that would suggest Commerce’s
intent to withdraw the Limiting Regulation.85
A final rule must be the “logical outgrowth” of a proposed
rulemaking.86 Further, a notice of proposed rulemaking must be closely
connected to the final rule and may not create a rule that would not
have been reasonably anticipated by the public.87 In Mid Continent Nail
Corp., the Federal Circuit found that the notices issued by Commerce
were not notices of withdrawal, and, thus, the withdrawal of the
Limiting Regulation was not the logical outgrowth of those notices.88
Because the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the CIT
Precision maintained its zero duty rate. Therefore, applying the
withdrawn regulation to this case, Precision had not engaged in
targeted dumping.89

79. Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 846 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
80. Id. at 1372–73.
81. Proposed Methodology for Identifying and Analyzing Target Dumping in
Antidumping Investigations; Request for Comment, 73 Fed. Reg. 26,371 (May 9,
2008); Targeted Dumping in Antidumping Investigations; Request for Comment, 72
Fed. Reg. 60,651 (Oct. 25, 2007).
82. 72 Fed. Reg. 60,651 (Oct. 25, 2007).
83. Id.
84. 73 Fed. Reg. 26,371 (May 9, 2008).
85. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1375–76.
86. Id. at 1373; see also Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 n.51
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
87. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 846 F.3d at 1373.
88. Id. at 1370, 1372.
89. Id. at 1385.
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B. American Tubular Products v. United States
In American Tubular Products v. United States,90 the Federal Circuit
addressed average surrogate values of oil country tubular goods (OCTG)
exported from China, a non-market economy (NME).91 Within its
antidumping inquiry, Commerce asked one of the producers selected as a
mandatory respondent, Jiangsu Cheng Steel Tube Share Co. (“Chengde”),
American Tubular’s Chinese exporter, whether it produced goods using
carbon steel or alloy steel, the former being lower cost.92
When assessing the fair market value of an export from an NME,
Commerce utilizes the value from a surrogate market economy.93
Chengde initially told Commerce that it utilized alloy steel in its
production; however, it later corrected that statement to say that it utilized
carbon steel and, at Commerce’s request, provided sample mill
certificates reflecting the use of carbon steel.94 Commerce accepted the
sample mill certificates as evidence that Chengde indeed used carbon
steel in sixteen of nineteen sales and applied the value of carbon steel
from Indonesia, Chengde’s appointed surrogate country, to those sales.95
However, Commerce chose to classify all remaining sales as based upon
alloy steel since the producer did not provide evidence suggesting that the
producer had exclusively used carbon steel in producing the OCTGs.96
For the remaining portions of alloy steel, Commerce “used a simple average
of the surrogate values for carbon and alloy steel . . . [and] recalculated
Chengde’s weighted average dumping margin as 137.62%.”97
90. 847 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
91. Id. at 1356, 1359–60; 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (2012) (defining a non-market
economy as one that “does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing
structures” such that pricing does not reflect the “fair value of the merchandise”).
92. 847 F.3d at 1356–57.
93. Id. at 1356 (citing Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the People’s
Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the First Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review, Rescission in Part and Intent to Rescind in Part, 77 Fed. Reg. 34,013, 34,015
(June 8, 2012)). When Commerce “conducts an administrative review of imports from
an NME country,” the imports should be “valued in a surrogate market economy . . .
country or countries considered to be appropriate” by Commerce. 77 Fed. Reg.
34,015. The surrogate market economy country or countries should be “at a level of
economic development comparable to that of the NME country,” and should be
“significant producers of comparable merchandise.” Id.
94. Am. Tubular Prods., 847 F.3d at 1357. The sample mill certificates “contained
information on the chemical composition of the sampled OCTG, which constituted a
portion, but not all, of OCTG sold in sixteen of nineteen sales made by Chengde
during the period of review.” Id.
95. Id. at 1356–57.
96. Id. at 1357–58.
97. Id. at 1358.
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The CIT held that Commerce was reasonable in its decision to use
an average surrogate value of carbon steel and alloy steel and its
conclusion that Chengde used the more expensive steel input in its
production process; the Federal Circuit agreed.98 Commerce also found
evidence that the producer had other contracts in which it utilized alloy
steel.99 And, because the producer did not provide complete details
about its sales to prove the exclusive use of carbon steel, Commerce was
free to make a reasonable decision as to how to calculate the average
surrogate value of the alloy steel.100
C. Changzhou Hawd Flooring v. United States
In Changzhou Hawd Flooring, the Federal Circuit considered whether
Commerce could depart from the statutory “expected method” applied
to firms investigated individually in a dumping investigation and instead
could apply the “separate rate” method without justification.101 The
appellants, Chinese manufacturers of multilayered hardwood flooring,
asserted their right to be excluded from a China-wide antidumping duty
rate applied to firms based upon the firms’ connection to the Chinese
government.102 The appellants contended that they should be treated
as independent of the Chinese government.103 Commerce chose not to
investigate the appellants but applied a separate rate for them that, while
“not specified numerically,” was more than de minimis.104 The CIT
supported Commerce’s conclusion, but the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded the case.105
Commerce initiated its investigation into Chinese exporters of
multilayered, hardwood flooring in 2010, ultimately selecting three
mandatory respondents for further investigation.106 As an NME,
Commerce presumes that Chinese firms are state-controlled; however,

98. Id. at 1359–60.
99. Id. at 1360 (discussing evidence on the producer’s website, which showed “that
it sold OCTG made of alloy under two contracts during the period of review”).
100. Id.
101. Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States, 848 F.3d 1006, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.; Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1354
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2015), vacated, 848 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
106. See Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1376, 1389
n.31, 1390 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015), vacated, 848 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining
that while Commerce received multiple voluntary respondent requests in its
investigation, they ultimately denied all voluntary requests and selected three
respondents, including Changzhou Hawd Flooring Company).
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this presumption is rebuttable.107 In this case, Commerce assigned a
de minimis duty rate to the three mandatory respondents and a Chinawide duty rate of 25.62%.108 In total, seventy-four firms established
their independence from the state.109 Commerce applied a separate
rate to these firms, averaging the de minimis rate and the China-wide
rate for a final duty rate of 6.41%.110
This methodology, known as the “expected method” of determining a
dumping margin, was established in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
as part of the multilateral trade negotiations under the umbrella of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.111 It requires Commerce to
“weight-average the zero and de minimis margins and margins determined
pursuant to the facts available, provided that volume data is available.”112
Only if Commerce finds that this method would not reasonably reflect
dumping margins can another method be applied.113
In this case, Commerce selected three firms as representative of the
Chinese market.114 And, even though those three firms did not
constitute the majority of exports for these flooring products, the
Federal Circuit held that Commerce was not permitted to deviate from
the expected rate methodology unless it found substantial evidence
that a separate rate was necessary, which Commerce did not do here.115
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the CIT’s decision and
remanded the case for further analysis regarding the separate rate
determination.116
D.

Meridian Products, LLC v. United States

The dispute in Meridian Products117 began in 2012, when Meridian

107. See Changzhou Wujin Fine Chem. Factory Co. v. United States, 701 F.3d 1367,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
108. Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co., 848 F.3d at 1009 (explaining that as part of its
investigation of multilayered wood flooring from China, Commerce chose the three
largest exporters by volume as representatives of the market, therefore making them
mandatory respondents).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3624 (2012)); see also Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. NO. 103-316, at 873 (1994).
112. H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 873.
113. Id.
114. Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States, 848 F.3d 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
115. Id. at 1012–13.
116. Id. at 1013.
117. 851 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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Products requested a “scope ruling” from Commerce to exclude
certain aluminum trim kit packages (“trim kits”) from the scope of an
antidumping order on aluminum extrusions from China.118
Commerce initially found that the trim kits fell within the order and,
after a series of appeals and remands, the CIT concluded under protest
that they fell outside the scope of the order.119 The Government
appealed the CIT’s decision and the Federal Circuit reversed.120
Antidumping orders are often broad and cover such a range of
goods that the orders may unintentionally capture certain related
goods under the order.121 Accordingly, Commerce is permitted by
statute to issue scope rulings that define whether certain goods fall
within a published order.122
Scope rulings are performed upon request of an interested party.123
A scope ruling considers three elements that determine whether a
product is subject to an order.124 First, Commerce considers the text
of the order itself to assess its defined scope.125 Second, Commerce
consults descriptions of the product in other sources.126 And finally,
Commerce weighs other factors that compare the specific product to
the product outlined in the order.127 Once Commerce makes this
evaluation, courts give substantial deference to its expert
interpretation of its own antidumping orders.128
In Meridian, Commerce determined that the merchandise in
question fell within the scope of the order, which Meridian
challenged.129 The CIT disagreed and encouraged Commerce to
reevaluate its position, finding that “[c]ontext renders unreasonable
Commerce’s reading of the exclusionary language of the scope.”130
However, the Federal Circuit found that the CIT interpreted the
118. Id. at 1378.
119. Meridian Prods. v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1331 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2016), rev’d, 851 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
120. Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1385.
121. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a) (2005) (stating that issues regarding the scope of an
antidumping or countervailing duty order can arise because the descriptions of a
merchandise contained within the orders “must be written in general terms”).
122. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) (2012).
123. Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1379.
124. Id. at 1381.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. King Supply Co. v. United States, 674 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
129. Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1378.
130. Meridian Prods. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1316 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2015), rev’d, 851 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

2018]

2017 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW DECISIONS

1343

procedure to analyze scope rulings too narrowly, taking away from the
broad discretion afforded Commerce in such interpretations.131 The
Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision and ordered the CIT to
reinstate Commerce’s original conclusion because, in the Federal
Circuit’s opinion, Commerce reasonably interpreted the order and the
order’s exclusions to include Meridian’s products.132
E.

Boomerang Tube LLC v. United States

Boomerang Tube LLC v. United States133 involved a dispute over the
determination of normal value to set a dumping margin for Saudi
exporters of OCTG products.134 Commerce issued a preliminary
antidumping order on OCTG products originating in Saudi Arabia, as
well as other countries, and sought input from Duferco, the largest of
fourteen known Saudi OCTG exporters and the sole mandatory
respondent.135 Commerce sought data to determine the arms-length
sales price to calculate the “normal value” of the exported products.136
After determining that Duferco had no arms-length domestic sales,
Commerce followed the constructed value approach by using profit
figures from Saudi Steel Pipes Company.137 Boomerang, a Missouribased OCTG seller, objected to the use of Saudi Steel data because
Boomerang argued it was more similar to a pipeline producer rather
than an OCTG producer.138 Alternatively, Duferco suggested using the
financial statement of an unaffiliated buyer or an affiliated Colombian
distributor.139 Ultimately, Commerce decided to use the Colombian
sales to determine the normal value.140
Boomerang further argued that Commerce failed to collapse the
affiliated Colombian distributor costs into the sales data, thereby giving
Duferco and other Saudi exporters a de minimis dumping margin that
resulted in Commerce terminating the dumping investigation.141
Duferco countered by arguing that Boomerang failed to exhaust its

131. Meridian Prods., 851 F.3d at 1382–84.
132. Id. at 1384–85.
133. 856 F.3d 908 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
134. Id. at 910–11.
135. Id. at 909–10.
136. Id. at 910.
137. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(B)(iii) (2012) (explaining the constructed value
process); Boomerang Tube, 856 F.3d at 910.
138. Boomerang Tube, 856 F.3d at 910.
139. Id. at 910–11.
140. Id. at 911.
141. Id. at 909–12.
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administrative remedies during the preliminary investigation.142 The CIT
agreed with Boomerang’s argument and held that Boomerang did not
have to raise these objections during the investigation because Commerce
gave no indication of its plans to rely on the Colombian data.143
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the CIT’s findings and
held that it was evident Commerce might rely on the Colombian data,
and that Boomerang had an opportunity to object but failed to do so.144
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded the CIT should have
dismissed Boomerang’s appeal because Boomerang had not exhausted
its administrative remedies.145 Since the CIT’s failure to dismiss
Boomerang’s appeal constituted an abuse of discretion, the Federal
Circuit vacated the CIT’s decision and remanded the matter.146
F. Suntec Industries Co. v. United States
The Federal Circuit in Suntec Industries Co. v. United States147
addressed notice obligations of domestic entities to foreign entities
during an administrative review.148 Suntec, a Chinese exporter, was
subject to a 2008 antidumping order covering certain steel nails from
China.149 Mid Continent Nail Corporation, a domestic entity,
requested that Commerce conduct its third administrative review of
the 2008 antidumping order; however, Mid Continent violated its
regulatory service obligation by failing to notify Suntec, which was
named in the antidumping order and in Mid Continent’s request, of
the review.150 Because of this violation and Suntec’s “lapse in its
relationship with the counsel who had been its representative for years
in the steel-nail proceedings,” Suntec became aware of the order only
after (or shortly before) it had been finalized.151 Suntec complained

142. Id. at 911.
143. Id. at 911–12.
144. Id. at 913.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 857 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
148. Id. at 1364.
149. Id. at 1365.
150. Id. at 1364, 1365.
151. Id. at 1364. See generally Certain Steel Nails from the People’s Republic of
China: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Partial Affirmative
Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,977 (June 16, 2008)
(explaining Commerce’s preliminary determination that certain Chinese steel nail
importers were engaging in dumping, and Commerce’s final determination subjecting
Suntec, among other companies, to a duty rate of 21.24% and suspending all
liquidation of subject merchandise).
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to the CIT that Mid Continent’s failure to notify it of the investigation
should merit the setting aside of the order with respect to Suntec.152
The CIT disagreed, concluding that the publication of the initial
investigation in the Federal Register provided sufficient notice.153 The
Federal Circuit agreed.154
Suntec, which had been assigned a separate duty rate of 21.24%
during the first two administrative reviews, was subjected to the allChina rate of 118.04% because it did not participate in the third
administrative review.155 Suntec contended that Mid Continent’s service
failure prejudiced Suntec’s opportunity to participate in the third
review.156 However, the Federal Circuit found that while this failure may
excuse Suntec from the investigation, Commerce’s publication in the
Federal Register of its intent to investigate was sufficient to put Suntec
on notice, especially because Suntec was named in the antidumping
order and had participated in the first two administrative reviews.157
G.

United States v. American Home Assurance Co.

In United States v. American Home Assurance Co.,158 a surety, American
Home Assurance Company (“AHAC”), provided bonds to three
separate importers of crawfish tail meat and preserved mushrooms from
China.159 The bonds required AHAC to pay any duty, tax, or charge
resulting from the covered activities up to the face amount of the
bonds.160 CBP liquidated the importers’ entries of these goods and
assessed antidumping duties, but the importers failed to pay the
duties.161 Accordingly, AHAC, as the surety, became obligated to pay.162
CBP notified AHAC of the its intent to charge interest for non-payment
on the bonds, but AHAC still failed to pay.163 Ultimately, the
Government sued AHAC at the CIT for the monies due and for

152. Suntec Indus., 857 F.3d at 1364–65.
153. Id. at 1365.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1365–66.
156. Id. at 1366.
157. See id. at 1366, 1369–72 (concluding that the default rule that notices published
in the Federal Register constitute effective notice as a matter of law extends to foreign
importers); Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews
and Requests for Revocations in Part, 76 Fed. Reg. 61,076, 61,078, 61,082 (Oct. 3, 2011).
158. 857 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
159. Id. at 1332.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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equitable and statutory prejudgment interest.164
The central issue in this case was whether the CIT could award CBP
both statutory and equitable prejudgment interest or whether that
would, as AHAC argued, over-compensate the Government.165 Statutory
prejudgment interest is set at six percent and is charged monthly
beginning thirty days after liquidation.166 The CIT may also award
equitable interest “to compensate for the loss of use of money” prior to
judgment.167 The amount of equitable interest is determined using
common law principles.168 Here, CBP argued that it should be able to
charge both types of prejudgment interest, while AHAC argued that
this would overcompensate the Government.169 Here, in its judgment
on the pleadings, the CIT disagreed and denied the Government’s
request for both forms of prejudgment interest.170
The Federal Circuit explained that equitable remedies generally are
unavailable when statutory remedies are available and would suffice.171
However, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015
expressly permits the charging of both types of prejudgment interest.172
The Act states that “[e]quitable interest under common law and interest
under . . . 19 U.S.C. [§] 580 [may be] awarded by a court against a surety
under its bond for late payment of antidumping duties.”173 Thus, the
Federal Circuit found that the CIT did not abuse its discretion in
declining to award both types of prejudgment interest.174
The next question the Federal Circuit addressed is whether the CIT is

164. Id.
165. Id. at 1332–33.
166. See 19 U.S.C. § 580 (2012) (“Upon all bonds, on which suits are brought for
the recovery of duties, interest shall be allowed, at the rate of [six] per centum a year,
from the time when said bonds became due.”); Am. Home Assurance Co., 857 F.3d at
1335.
167. See Am. Home Assurance Co., 857 F.3d at 1333 (citing Princess Cruises, Inc. v.
United States, 397 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
168. See id. at 1333 (explaining that a judge may consider “the degree of
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, the availability of alternative investment
opportunities to the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff delayed bringing the action, and
other fundamental considerations of fairness” in deciding whether to award equitable
prejudgment interest).
169. Id. at 1332–33.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1333.
172. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125,
§ 605(c)(2), 130 Stat. 122, 187–88 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 4401); Am. Home
Assurance Co., 857 F.3d at 1334.
173. § 605(c)(2)(C).
174. Am. Home Assurance Co., 857 F.3d at 1334.
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obligated to direct CBP to charge both types of prejudgment interest.175
To this question, the Federal Circuit concluded that the CIT has the
discretion to decide whether it wishes to authorize the award of both
equitable and statutory prejudgment interest or whether only statutory
will be permitted.176 The Federal Circuit upheld the decision of the CIT
only to authorize the award of equitable interest.177
H. Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States
In Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States,178 an exporter objected to
Commerce’s use of an adverse-facts-available (AFA) rate in a
countervailing duty investigation after the exporter failed to comply with
an information request from Commerce that it considered too
burdensome.179 Upon beginning its investigation into allegations that
the Government of Turkey was providing countervailing duty subsidies
for producers of OCTGs, Commerce selected Borusan Mannesmann
Boru Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. and Borusan Istikbal Ticaret (collectively,
“Borusan”) as mandatory respondents.180 Commerce sent Borusan a
questionnaire inquiring about Borusan’s use of hot-rolled steel in its
production of OCTG.181 Borusan responded that while it had three
factories during the period of investigation, only one of those factories
produced subject OCTG.182 Borusan proceeded to provide the data for
the one factory, but “noted that it had difficulty compiling that
information” because the process was “burdensome,” would take its staff
over two weeks to complete, and would require Borusan to print over
300 pages.183 Further, Borusan failed to provide data on the other two
locations, arguing that requiring that data “would impose great
burdens . . . for no purpose.”184 When Commerce pressed Borusan for
data on the other two locations, Borusan failed to comply, citing its

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (“We conclude that the Trade Court retains broad discretion to apply
nonstatutory prejudgment interest according to traditional equitable principles, which
is exactly what it did in this case.”).
178. 857 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Maverick Tube I].
179. Id. at 1355–56; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (2012) (providing that Commerce
may employ an inference adverse to a party’s interests if that party has failed to comply
with a request for information).
180. Maverick Tube I, 857 F.3d at 1355. The Federal Circuit treated both companies
as a single respondent. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1355–56.
184. Id. at 1356.
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difficulties in collecting data on the first location.185 In response,
Borusan attempted to explain its burdens to Commerce by invoking 19
U.S.C. § 1677m(c)(1).186 Nonetheless, Commerce ultimately issued
Borusan an AFA duty rate, which Borusan challenged at the CIT.187
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Government, finding that
Borusan failed to comply with Commerce’s request for information or
provide a reasonable justification for why it could not provide that
information:
If [Commerce] . . . finds that an interested party has failed to
cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a
request for information from [Commerce], [then Commerce] . . .
may use an inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in
selecting from among the facts otherwise available.188

The Federal Circuit explained that Commerce lacks subpoena power
and thus must use the threat of AFA to incentivize a response from
respondents.189 Commerce cannot force a respondent to provide
information that it needs to calculate values used in dumping and subsidy
investigations. Thus, its power to disincentivize non-responses with the use
of AFA findings, which are generally less favorable to the respondent,
serves as a viable means to encourage participation in its investigation.
I.

Maverick Tube Corp. v. Toscelik Profil ve Sac Endustrisi A.S.

Commerce’s antidumping investigation into Turkish OCTGs was
back before the Federal Circuit approximately one month later.190 In
Maverick Tube Corp. v. Toscelik Profil ve Sac Endustrisi A.S.,191 the Federal
Circuit addressed duty drawbacks and their effects on dumping margin
calculations.192 A duty drawback occurs when an exporter subject to
185. Id.
186. Id.
[I]f an interested party notifies Commerce promptly after receiving a request
that it is “unable to submit the information requested in the requested form
and manner, together with a full explanation and suggested alternative
forms,” then Commerce “shall consider the ability of the interested party” and
“may modify such requirements to the extent necessary to avoid imposing an
unreasonable burden on that party.”
Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(c)(1) (2012)).
187. Id. at 1356–57.
188. See id. at 1360 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)).
189. Id. at 1360 (citing Essar Steel Ltd. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)).
190. Maverick Tube Corp. v. Toscelik Profil ve Sac Endustrisi A.S., 861 F.3d 1269,
1271 (Fed. Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Maverick Tube II].
191. 861 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
192. Id. at 1271.
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an antidumping order in the United States receives a refund from
previously paid import duties for foreign components provided the
explorer exports the finished product.193 When that finished product
is exported to the United States, the exporter can use that duty
drawback to reduce its dumping margin by raising its export price by
the amount of the duty drawback.194
The appellant, Çayirova, operated in Turkey, which allows for a
refund of import duties paid on inputs used in finished goods for
exports as well as for imports of similar goods as those used in finished
goods for export.195 Çayirova’s goods that were subject to the
antidumping order and exported to the United States did not contain
imported components that garnered a duty refund from the government
of Turkey; however, Çayirova imported similar inputs—not used in the
finished goods at issue here—for which they did receive duty
refunds.196 Çayirova contended that Commerce should use those
refunds to offset its dumping margin by raising its export price.197
Commerce countered that point, asserting that, because Çayirova did
not use any of the inputs for which the Government of Turkey provided
a refund of duties, Çayirova was not entitled to a duty drawback
adjustment.198 Commerce’s interpretation of the applicable statute was
that an exporter is only entitled to a duty drawback adjustment when the
duties refunded were on inputs used to manufacture the finished

193. Id.
When calculating the dumping margin,
if a foreign country would normally impose an import duty on an
input used to manufacture the subject merchandise, but offers a
rebate or exemption from the duty if the input is exported to the
United States, then Commerce will increase [the export price] to
account for the rebated or unpaid import duty (the “duty drawback”).
. . . “The purpose of the duty drawback adjustment is to account for the fact
that the producers remain subject to the import duty when they sell the subject
merchandise domestically, which increases home market sales prices and
thereby increases [the normal value].”
Id. (quoting Saha Thai Steel Pipe (Public) Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d 1335, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
194. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(B) (2012) (providing that the export price “shall
be . . . increased by . . . the amount of any import duties imposed by the country of
exportation which have been rebated, or which have not been collected, by reason of
the exportation of the subject merchandise to the United States”).
195. Maverick Tube II, 861 F.3d at 1271–72.
196. Id. at 1272.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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products exported to the United States under the antidumping order.199
In response, Çayirova argued that the statute was unambiguous and did
not allow Commerce to impose its own “threshold test.”200
The Federal Circuit analyzed Commerce’s interpretation using
Chevron’s201 two-step analysis. First, the court asked whether Congress
unambiguously spoke about the specific issue in the statute.202 The
Federal Circuit concluded that, while the statute was unambiguous for
other issues, Congress did not address this specific issue, and thus,
Commerce had discretion to apply its own interpretation.203 Second,
the Federal Circuit assessed whether Commerce’s interpretation was
reasonable, providing great discretion to Commerce.204 Here, the
Federal Circuit found that Commerce’s interpretation was reasonable,
and that it made sense to exclude refunds on inputs that were not used
in manufacturing the product exported to the United States.205 Thus,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s findings.206
J.

Apex Frozen Foods Private Ltd. v. United States

In Apex Frozen Foods Private Ltd. v. United States,207 the Federal Circuit
addressed a challenge to Commerce’s methodology to calculate
antidumping duties on the export of “certain frozen warmwater shrimp
from India.”208 On appeal, the CIT upheld Commerce’s methodology
of applying the average-to-transaction and zeroing approaches to
calculate the dumping margin.209

199. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(B)).
200. Id. at 1272–73 (articulating Commerce’s threshold test as prohibiting a duty
drawback adjustment “when the exempted goods could not be used as inputs to
produce the subject merchandise”); see also Saha Thai Steel Pipe (Public) Co. v. United
States, 635 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(B)
(2012)) (addressing whether “Commerce may only increase [the export value] when
import duties are ‘imposed by the country of exportation’ and then later rebated”
rather than when the import duties “have not been collected” to begin with).
201. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
202. Maverick Tube II, 861 F.3d at 1273–74 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1274.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 862 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
208. Id. at 1340. Apex Frozen Foods, a non-mandatory respondent, challenged the
results of Commerce’s eighth administrative review of the antidumping order on the
Indian warmwater shrimp. Id.
209. Apex Frozen Foods Private Ltd. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 3d 1308 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2016), aff’d, 862 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Apex Frozen Foods, 862 F.3d at 1340;
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In Apex Frozen Foods, Commerce found a pattern of export prices that
differed significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time.210
With this finding, Commerce applied the exception and used the averageto-transaction approach to assess targeted dumping.211 Apex, among
others, argued that Commerce did not reasonably justify the use of this
method over the average-to-average method.212 Analyzing Commerce’s
action under Chevron, the Federal Circuit found the applicable statute
ambiguous and concluded that Commerce’s application of the meaningful
difference test was a reasonable explanation for its use of the average-totransaction methodology.213 In sum, the Federal Circuit upheld the CIT’s
decision, finding Commerce’s application of the average-to-transaction
methodology in this case reasonable.214
K. Diamond Sawblades Manufacturers Coalition v. United States
In Diamond Sawblades Manufacturers Coalition v. United States,215 the
Federal Circuit examined an antidumping order on Chinese exporters of
diamond sawblades.216 Because China is considered an NME, Commerce
“begins with a rebuttable presumption that all companies within the
country are subject to government control” and thus their home-market
pricing data cannot be relied upon to establish a home market price.217
Here, the subject exporter, Advanced Tech and Materials Company
(“ATM”), established an absence of government control and was
afforded a separate rate of 2.50%, compared to the country-wide rate
of 82.12% on the subject goods.218 Diamond Sawblades Manufacturers
Coalition, on behalf of the domestic industry in the United States,
challenged Commerce’s separate rate determination.219 After hearing
the case, the CIT remanded to Commerce so it could explain how it

see also supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text (explaining the three dumping
calculations that Commerce employs).
210. 862 F.3d at 1342–43.
211. Id. at 1341, 1343.
212. Id. at 1344.
213. Id. at 1348.
214. Id. at 1351.
215. 866 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
216. Id. at 1307.
217. Id. (quoting Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Final
Partial Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances: Diamond Sawblades and
Parts Thereof from the People’s Republic of China, 71 Fed. Reg. 29,303, 29,307 (May
22, 2006)); see also supra note 91 (defining a non-market economy).
218. Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal., 866 F.3d at 1306–07.
219. Id. at 1307.
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established the separate rate.220 On remand, Commerce once again
concluded that ATM “was entitled to the separate rate of 2.50%.”221 On
second appeal, CIT once again concluded that Commerce “failed to
consider important aspects of the problem.”222 In the second remand,
Commerce switched its position and concluded that ATM had failed to
rebut the presumption of government control.223
In Commerce’s final determination, it found that ATM lacked
independent management because four of its senior officials on the
board and the other five board members were nominated by the China
Iron & Steel Research Institute, which is wholly-owned by the State-Owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commissions of the State Council
of China.224 ATM was subjected to the then China-wide rate of
164.09%.225 However, given that ATM fully cooperated with the
investigation during the first administrative review, and that ATM was
subjected to the China-wide rate, Commerce decided to update the
China-wide rate by averaging the no longer applicable ATM separate duty
rate of 0.15% and the China-wide rate, yielding a new China-wide rate of
82.12%.226 On appeal, the CIT upheld Commerce’s recalculation.227
ATM argued that its cooperation during the first administrative review
should qualify it for a separate rate.228 It contended the application of
the China-wide rate to entities that cooperate creates a disincentive for
cooperation.229 The Federal Circuit disagreed and held that the Chinawide rate would always include the rebuttable presumption that an
entity is not state-controlled; however, failure to rebut that presumption
would subject an entity to the China-wide rate.230 The Federal Circuit
noted that “the fact of cooperation may help an entity in a NME country
seek a reduction of the country-wide rate, as it did here, but it does not,
220. Id. at 1308 (citing Advanced Tech. & Materials Co. v. United States, 885 F.
Supp. 2d 1343, 1348–49 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012)).
221. Id. (citing Advanced Tech., 885 F. Supp. 2d at 1348–49).
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing Advanced Tech. & Materials Co. v. United States, 938 F. Supp. 2d
1342, 1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013), aff’d, 581 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1309.
227. Id. (citing Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v. United States, No. 13-00078, 2015
WL 5603898, at *1 (Ct. Int’l Trade Sept. 23, 2015)).
228. Id. at 1310. ATM cited to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) for the proposition that
Commerce may only find an AFA when a party has failed to comply with Commerce’s
requests for information. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(1) (2012)); see also supra
note 179 and accompanying text.
229. Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal., 866 F.3d at 1310.
230. Id. at 1310–11.
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without more, save it from that rate.”231
CONCLUSION
The effect of an antidumping duty or a classification that bears a higher
tariff rate can have dramatic economic effects on foreign exporters to the
United States.232 One extensive firm-level study of Chinese exporters
found that antidumping duties imposed by the United States resulted in
a twelve percent decline in labor productivity in those targeted Chinese
firms.233 Additionally, a 2006 study by a Department of Justice antitrust
attorney on the effects of antidumping duties on the levels of foreign
imports to the United States reported, despite a lack of evidence, a 0.9%
decline in imports because of those duties.234
Recent trends show that China remains the most investigated
exporter for potential dumping and immediate goods, usually related to
the steel industry, which tends to be the sector most frequently
challenging those dumping orders.235 It is also worth noting that
antidumping and countervailing duty cases have been more frequently
combined, rather than filed as separate cases as was practice in the
past,236 as seen in Maverick Tube II.237 More activity in the steel sector and
with China can be expected, especially as U.S. protectionism increases
and trade tensions continue to grow.238

231. Id. at 1315.
232. WILLIAM W. NYE, WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING DUTIES ON IMPORTS?
SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE SUNSET REVIEW PROCESS 6–7 (2006).
233. Piyush Chandra & Cheryl Long, Anti-dumping Duties and Their Impact on
Exporters: Firm Level Evidence from China, 51 WORLD DEV. 169, 174 (2013).
234. NYE, supra note 232, at 15–16.
235. See Michael D. Wright, A Critique of the Public Choice Theory Case for Privatization:
Rhetoric and Reality, 25 OTTAWA L. REV. 1, 4 n.7 (explaining that immediate goods and
services include “desks, laundry services, [and] highway maintenance”); Jim Zarroli,
China Churns Out Half the World’s Steel, and Other Steelmakers Feel Pinched, NPR (Mar. 8,
2018, 5:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591637097/china-churns-outhalf-the-worlds-steel-and-other-steelmakers-feel-pinched (explaining that China is a
global leader in the steel industry and has often been accused by other countries of
“dumping steel at artificially low prices”).
236. See, e.g., Elliot J. Feldman & John J. Burke, Testing the Limits of Trade Law
Rationality: The GPX Case and Subsidies in Non-Market Economies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 787,
788 (2013) (discussing the GPX cases, which are a group of cases involving an
American importer of off-the-road tires from China).
237. Maverick Tube II, 861 F.3d 1269, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see supra Section II.I.
238. Zarroli, supra note 235 (elaborating on concerns about President Trump’s
newly imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum).

